

Randall Schweller Unanswered Threats

Since Gideon Rose's 1998 review article in the journal *World Politics* and especially following the release of Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro's 2009 edited volume *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, neoclassical realism has emerged as major theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Proponents of neoclassical realism claim that it is the logical extension of the Kenneth Waltz's structural realism into the realm of foreign policy. In *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Relations*, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell argue that neoclassical realism is far more than an extension of Waltz's structural realism or an effort to update the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, and Henry Kissinger with the language of modern social science. Rejecting the artificial distinction that Waltz draws between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy, the authors contend neoclassical realism can explain and predict phenomena ranging from short-term crisis-behavior, to foreign policy, to patterns of grand strategic adjustment by individual states up to long-term patterns of international outcomes. It is, therefore, a more powerful theory of international politics than structural realism. Yet it is also a more intuitively satisfying approach than liberal *Innenpolitik* theories or constructivism. The authors detail the variables and assumptions of neoclassical realist theory, address various aspects of theory construction and methodology, lay out the areas of convergence and sharp disagreement with other leading theoretical approaches -- liberalism, constructivism, analytic eclecticism, and foreign policy analysis (FPA) --- and demonstrate how neoclassical realist theory can be used to resolve longstanding puzzles and debates in international relations theory.

This book argues that the internal dynamics of states affect their foreign policies, as well as the nature of the international system.

An in-depth look at the historic and strategic deployment of rights in political conflicts throughout the world Rights are usually viewed as defensive concepts representing mankind's highest aspirations to protect the vulnerable and uplift the downtrodden. But since the Enlightenment, political combatants have also used rights belligerently, to batter despised communities, demolish existing institutions, and smash opposing ideas. Delving into a range of historical and contemporary conflicts from all areas of the globe, *Rights as Weapons* focuses on the underexamined ways in which the powerful wield rights as aggressive weapons against the weak. Clifford Bob looks at how political forces use rights as rallying cries: naturalizing novel claims as rights inherent in humanity, absolutizing them as trumps over rival interests or community concerns, universalizing them as transcultural and transhistorical, and depoliticizing them as concepts beyond debate. He shows how powerful proponents employ rights as camouflage to cover ulterior motives, as crowbars to break rival coalitions, as blockades to suppress subordinate groups, as spears to puncture discrete policies, and as dynamite to explode whole societies. And he demonstrates how the targets of rights campaigns repulse such assaults, using their own rights-like weapons: denying the abuses they are accused of, constructing rival rights to protect themselves, portraying themselves as victims rather than violators, and repudiating authoritative decisions against them. This sophisticated framework is applied to a diverse range of examples, including nineteenth-century voting rights movements; the American civil rights movement; nationalist, populist, and religious movements in today's Europe; and internationalized conflicts related to Palestinian self-determination, animal rights, gay rights, and transgender rights. Comparing key episodes in the deployment of rights, *Rights as Weapons* opens new perspectives on an idea that is central to legal and political conflicts.

With their phenomenal growth rates, India and China are surging ahead as world economic powers. Due to increasing instability in the Middle

East, they have turned to Africa to procure oil to fuel their industrialisation process. Africa's economy stands to be impacted in various ways due to the increasing interaction with these 'Asian Giants'. This book analyses the acquisition of oil blocks by Indian and Chinese oil corporations in eleven West African countries. It describes the differences in how India and China mobilise oil externally to meet their respective goals and objectives. The book examines the rate of return on capital, rate of interest on loans and the ease of availability of loans, the difference in the level of technology and ability to acquire technology, project management skills, risk aversion, valuation of the asset and the difference in the economic, political and diplomatic support received by the Chinese and Indian oil companies from their respective governments. It is argued that the difference in the relative economic and political power of India and China accounts for the ability of Chinese oil companies to outbid their Indian competitors and/or be preferred as partners by international oil companies. Containing interviews from Indian and Chinese oil company executives, government officials, industry officials, former diplomats and scholars and academics from India, China and the UK, this book makes a valuable contribution to existing literature on India, China and the oil industry in West Africa. It will be a valuable resource for academics in the field of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Asian Business and Economics.

The balance of power is one of the most influential ideas in international relations, yet it has never been comprehensively examined in pre-modern or non-European contexts. This book redresses this imbalance. The authors present eight new case studies of balancing and balancing failure in pre-modern and non-European international systems.

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

How policies forged after September 11 were weaponized under Trump and turned on American democracy itself In the wake of the September 11 terror attacks, the American government implemented a wave of overt policies to fight the nation's enemies. Unseen and undetected by the public, however, another set of tools were brought to bear on the domestic front. In this riveting book, one of today's leading experts on the US security state shows how these "subtle tools" imperiled the very foundations of democracy, from the separation of powers and transparency in government to adherence to the Constitution. Taking readers from Ground Zero to the Capitol insurrection, Karen Greenberg describes the subtle tools that were forged under George W. Bush in the name of security: imprecise language, bureaucratic confusion, secrecy, and the bypassing of procedural and legal norms. While the power and legacy of these tools lasted into the Obama years, reliance on them increased exponentially in the Trump era, both in the fight against terrorism abroad and in battles closer to home. Greenberg discusses how the Trump administration weaponized these tools to separate families at the border, suppress Black Lives Matter protests, and attempt to overturn the 2020 presidential election. Revealing the deeper consequences of the war on terror, *Subtle Tools* paints a troubling portrait of an increasingly undemocratic America where disinformation, xenophobia, and disdain for the law became the new norm, and where the subtle tools of national security threatened democracy itself.

Neoclassical realism is an important approach to international relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand strategies. They examine the central role of

the 'state' and seek to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states intervene between their leaders' assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders are likely to pursue.

Maxwell's Demon and the Golden Apple will appeal to leaders of multinational corporations and government programs as well as instructors of undergraduate courses in international relations.

This book examines changes in Taiwan's policies toward Mainland China under former Republic of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-16) and considers their implications for US policy toward the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviors have heightened tensions with its regional neighbors as well as the United States. However, under the Kuomintang (KMT) administration of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan discounted Beijing's coercion and pursued rapprochement on the basis of the "1992 consensus," which was a tacit agreement reached between the KMT and Chinese Communist Party in 1992 that both Taiwan and the mainland belong to one China though that "China" is subjected to either side's different interpretations. The author of this volume analyzes why Taipei underreacted towards the security challenges posed by the PRC and chartered policies that sometimes went against the interests of Washington and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. The KMT was pushing for nation-building initiatives to rejuvenate the ROC's "one China" ruling legitimacy and to supplant pro-independence forces within Taiwan. The island's deeply fragmented domestic politics and partisanship have led policy elites to choose suboptimal strategy and, thereby, weakening its security position. The implications from this study are equally applicable to Taiwan's newly elected Democratic Progressive Party government that has taken office in 2016.

Presents the nature of historical knowledge by examining the multiple histories of the Arab-Israeli conflict written by Israeli scholars. This book also undertakes an analysis of literature, drawn from historians and political scientists of the Vietnam War, demonstrating that historical revisionism is not unique to the study of the Middle East.

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Experts consider whether American primacy will endure or if the future holds a multipolar world of several great powers. The unprecedented military, economic, and political power of the United States has led some observers to declare that we live in a unipolar world in which America enjoys primacy or even hegemony. At the same time public opinion polls abroad reveal high levels of anti-Americanism, and many foreign governments criticize U.S. policies. Primacy and Its Discontents explores the sources of American primacy, including the uses of U.S. military power, and the likely duration of unipolarity. It offers theoretical arguments for why the rest of the world will—or will not—align against the United States. Several chapters argue that the United States is not immune to the long-standing tendency of states to balance against power, while others contend that wise U.S. policies, the growing role of international institutions, and the spread of liberal democracy can limit anti-American balancing. The final chapters debate whether countries are already engaging in "soft balancing" against the United States. The contributors offer alternative prescriptions for U.S. foreign policy, ranging from vigorous efforts to maintain American primacy to acceptance of a multipolar

world of several great powers. Contributors Gerard Alexander, Stephen Brooks, John G. Ikenberry, Christopher Layne, Keir Lieber, John Owen IV, Robert Pape, T. V. Paul, Barry Posen, Kenneth Waltz, William Wohlforth

The Eurocentric conventional wisdom holds that the West is unique in having a multi-state system in international relations and liberal democracy in state-society relations. At the same time, the Sinocentric perspective believes that China is destined to have authoritarian rule under a unified empire. In fact, China in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (656–221 BC) was once a system of sovereign territorial states similar to Europe in the early modern period. Both cases witnessed the prevalence of war, formation of alliances, development of the centralized bureaucracy, emergence of citizenship rights, and expansion of international trade. This book, first published in 2005, examines why China and Europe shared similar processes but experienced opposite outcomes. This historical comparison of China and Europe challenges the presumption that Europe was destined to enjoy checks and balances while China was preordained to suffer under a coercive universal status.

This is the first book-length treatment of international politics in a unipolar world that adopts a structural realist perspective. It applies Waltz's microeconomic analogy to a market with a price leader. It concludes that unipolarity is sustainable as long as the unipole distributes rewards to other states.

All academic disciplines periodically appraise their effectiveness, evaluating the progress of previous scholarship and judging which approaches are useful and which are not. Although no field could survive if it did nothing but appraise its progress, occasional appraisals are important and if done well can help advance the field. This book investigates how international relations theorists can better equip themselves to determine the state of scholarly work in their field. It takes as its starting point Imre Lakatos's influential theory of scientific change, and in particular his methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP). It uses MSRP to organize its analysis of major research programs over the last several decades and uses MSRP's criteria for theoretical progress to evaluate these programs. The contributors appraise the progress of institutional theory, varieties of realist and liberal theory, operational code analysis, and other research programs in international relations. Their analyses reveal the strengths and limits of Lakatosian criteria and the need for metatheoretical metrics for evaluating scientific progress.

This book deals with two significant issues: the peculiar and paradoxical question of why regular armies, better suited to fighting conventional high-intensity wars, adopt inappropriate measures when fighting guerilla wars; and the evolution of the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine over the last decade. In addition, the book also includes the first detailed analysis of the trajectory of the army's counterinsurgency doctrine, arguing that while it was consolidated only over the last decade, the essential elements of the doctrine may in fact be traced back to the army's first confrontation with the Naga guerillas in the 1950s. It outlines the three essential elements that make up the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine: that there are no military solutions to an insurgency; that military force can only help to reduce levels of violence to enable political solutions; and that there should be limited use of military force. Rajagopalan argues that international circumstances — particularly the need to counter conventional military threats from Pakistan and China — led to a counterinsurgency doctrine that had a strong conventional war bias. This bias also conditioned the organisational culture of the Indian army.

How do established powers react to growing competitors? The United States currently faces a dilemma with regard to China and others over

whether to embrace competition and thus substantial present-day costs or collaborate with its rivals to garner short-term gains while letting them become more powerful. This problem lends considerable urgency to the lessons to be learned from *Over the Horizon*. David M. Edelstein analyzes past rising powers in his search for answers that point the way forward for the United States as it strives to maintain control over its competitors. Edelstein focuses on the time horizons of political leaders and the effects of long-term uncertainty on decision-making. He notes how state leaders tend to procrastinate when dealing with long-term threats, hoping instead to profit from short-term cooperation, and are reluctant to act precipitously in an uncertain environment. To test his novel theory, Edelstein uses lessons learned from history's great powers: late nineteenth-century Germany, the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, interwar Germany, and the Soviet Union at the origins of the Cold War. *Over the Horizon* demonstrates that cooperation between declining and rising powers is more common than we might think, although declining states may later regret having given upstarts time to mature into true threats. *Deadly Imbalances* offers a new approach, combining both the attributes of states and the structure of the international system to explain the origins and causes of the war. Central to Schweller's analysis is the argument that the structure of the international system was tripolar -- with Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States as the three central powers -- and that this needs to be considered in any examination of the antecedent causes and crucial events of the war.

The balance of power has been a central concept in the theory and practice of international relations for the past five hundred years. It has also played a key role in some of the most important attempts to develop a theory of international politics in the contemporary study of international relations. In this 2007 book, Richard Little establishes a framework that treats the balance of power as a metaphor, a myth and a model. He then uses this framework to reassess four major texts that use the balance of power to promote a theoretical understanding of international relations: Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (1948), Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society* (1977), Kenneth N. Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and John J. Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001). These reassessments allow the author to develop a more comprehensive model of the balance of power.

Realism has been the subject of critical scrutiny for some time and this examination aims to identify and define its strengths and shortcomings, making a contribution to the study of international relations.

"Neoclassical realism is a major theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy. Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell argue that it can explain and predict a far broader range of political phenomena in international politics. Neoclassical realism challenges other approaches, including structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism"--

A look at the duty of nations to protect human rights beyond borders, why it has failed in practice, and what can be done about it The idea that states share a responsibility to shield people everywhere from atrocities is presently under threat. Despite some early twenty-first century successes, including the 2005 United Nations endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect, the project has been placed into jeopardy due to catastrophes in such places as Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen; resurgent nationalism; and growing global antagonism. In *Sharing Responsibility*, Luke Glanville seeks to diagnose the current crisis in international protection by exploring its long and troubled history. With attention to ethics, law, and politics, he measures what possibilities remain for protecting people wherever they reside from atrocities, despite formidable challenges in the international arena. With a focus on Western natural law and the European society of states, Glanville shows that the history of the shared responsibility to protect is marked by courageous efforts, as well as troubling ties to Western imperialism,

evasion, and abuse. The project of safeguarding vulnerable populations can undoubtedly devolve into blame shifting and hypocrisy, but can also spark effective burden sharing among nations. Glanville considers how states should support this responsibility, whether it can be coherently codified in law, the extent to which states have embraced their responsibilities, and what might lead them to do so more reliably in the future. *Sharing Responsibility* wrestles with how countries should care for imperiled people and how the ideal of the responsibility to protect might inspire just behavior in an imperfect and troubled world.

This Reader Is A Collection Of First-Rate Theoretical Engagements Relating To International Relations From Across India. The Class Character Of Contemporary International Law, Reassessing The Conceptual Foundations Of Imperialism, Mapping Human Security, Evaluating The Gaze Of Orientalism And Defending The Analytical Relevance Of Gender As A Lens To Examine National Security Are Issues Covered In The Theoretical Ambit Of This Volume. The Book Also Addresses Two Other Core Issues: Contesting The Delhi-Centricity Of The Discipline And Acknowledging The Relevance Of Theory To Policy.

Why have states throughout history regularly underestimated dangers to their survival? Why have some states been able to mobilize their material resources effectively to balance against threats, while others have not been able to do so? The phenomenon of "underbalancing" is a common but woefully underexamined behavior in international politics. Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in paltry and imprudent ways. It is a response that directly contradicts the core prediction of structural realism's balance-of-power theory--that states motivated to survive as autonomous entities are coherent actors that, when confronted by dangerous threats, act to restore the disrupted balance by creating alliances or increasing their military capabilities, or, in some cases, a combination of both. Consistent with the new wave of neoclassical realist research, *Unanswered Threats* offers a theory of underbalancing based on four domestic-level variables--elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability--that channel, mediate, and redirect policy responses to external pressures and incentives. The theory yields five causal schemes for underbalancing behavior, which are tested against the cases of interwar Britain and France, France from 1877 to 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) that pitted tiny Paraguay against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Randall Schweller concludes that those most likely to underbalance are incoherent, fragmented states whose elites are constrained by political considerations.

How professionalization and scholarly "rigor" made social scientists increasingly irrelevant to US national security policy To mobilize America's intellectual resources to meet the security challenges of the post-9/11 world, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates observed that "we must again embrace eggheads and ideas." But the gap between national security policymakers and international relations scholars has become a chasm. In *Cult of the Irrelevant*, Michael Desch traces the history of the relationship between the Beltway and the Ivory Tower from World War I to the present day. Recounting key Golden Age academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling and Walt Rostow, Desch's narrative shows that social science research became most oriented toward practical problem-solving during times of war and that scholars returned to less relevant work during peacetime. Social science disciplines like political science rewarded work that was methodologically sophisticated over scholarship that engaged with the messy realities of national security policy, and academic culture increasingly turned away from the job of solving real-world problems. In the name of scientific objectivity, academics today frequently engage only in basic research that they hope will somehow trickle down to policymakers. Drawing on the lessons of this history as well as a unique survey of current and former national security policymakers, Desch offers concrete recommendations for scholars who want to shape government work. The result is a rich intellectual history and an essential wake-up call to a field that has lost its way.

A decade and a half of exhausting wars, punishing economic setbacks, and fast-rising rivals has called into question America's fundamental position and purpose in world politics. Will the US continue to be the only superpower in the international system? Should it continue advancing the world-shaping grand strategy it has followed since the Cold War? Or should it focus on internal problems? America Abroad takes stock of these debates and provides a powerful defense of American globalism. Since the end of World War Two, world politics has been shaped by two constants: America's position as the most powerful state, and its strategic choice to be deeply engaged in the world. But if America disengages from the world and reduces its footprint overseas, core US security and economic interests would be jeopardized. While America should remain globally engaged, it has to focus primarily on its core interests or run the risk of overextension. A bracing rejoinder to the critics of American globalism—a more potent force than ever in the Trump era—America Abroad is a powerful reminder that a robust American presence is crucial for maintaining world order.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in the most ambitious and far-reaching liberal order building the world had yet seen. This liberal international order has been one of the most successful in providing security and prosperity to more people, but in the last decade the American-led order has been troubled. Some argue that the Bush administration undermined it. Others argue that we are witnessing the end of the American era. In *Liberal Leviathan* G. John Ikenberry argues that the crisis that besets the American-led order is a crisis of authority. The forces that have triggered this crisis have resulted from the successful functioning and expansion of the postwar liberal order, not its breakdown.

The *Realism Reader* provides broad coverage of a centrally important tradition in the study of foreign policy and international politics. After some years in the doldrums, political realism is again in contention as a leading tradition in the international relations sub-field. Divided into three main sections, the book covers seven different and distinctive approaches within the realist tradition: classical realism, balance of power theory, neorealism, defensive structural realism, offensive structural realism, rise and fall realism, and neoclassical realism. The middle section of the volume covers realism's engagement with critiques levelled by liberalism, institutionalism, and constructivism and the English School. The final section of the book provides materials on realism's engagement with some contemporary issues in international politics, with collections on United States (U.S.) hegemony, European cooperation, and whether future threats will arise from non-state actors or the rise of competing great powers. The book offers a logically coherent and manageable framework for organizing the realist canon, and provides exemplary literature in each of the traditions and dialogues which are included in the volume. Offering substantial commentary and analysis and including enhanced pedagogy to facilitate student learning, *The Realism Reader* will provide a 'one-stop-shop' for undergraduates and masters students taking a course in contemporary international relations theory, with a particular focus on realism.

Why do great powers accommodate the rise of some challengers but contain and confront others, even at the risk of war? *When Right Makes Might* proposes that the ways in which a rising power legitimizes its expansionist aims significantly shapes great power responses. Stacie E. Goddard theorizes that when faced with a new challenger, great powers will attempt to divine the challenger's intentions: does it pose a revolutionary threat to the system or can it be incorporated into the existing international order? Goddard departs from conventional theories of international relations by arguing that great powers come to understand a contender's intentions not only through objective capabilities or costly signals but by observing how a rising power justifies its behavior to its audience. To understand the dynamics of rising powers, then, we must take seriously the role of legitimacy in international relations. A rising power's ability to expand depends as much on its claims to right as it does on its growing might. As a result, *When Right Makes Might* poses significant questions for academics and policymakers alike.

Underpinning her argument on the oft-ignored significance of public self-presentation, Goddard suggests that academics (and others) should recognize talk's critical role in the formation of grand strategy. Unlike rationalist and realist theories that suggest rhetoric is mere window-dressing for power, *When Right Makes Might* argues that rhetoric fundamentally shapes the contours of grand strategy. Legitimacy is not marginal to international relations; it is essential to the practice of power politics, and rhetoric is central to that practice.

Reinhold Niebuhr's ideas about ethics, social justice, and foreign policy have been hugely influential for American political thought, and this has been true across the political spectrum, from progressive social justice activists to neo-conservatives. A one-time leader in the Socialist party, Niebuhr worked with Eleanor Roosevelt to found Americans for Democratic Action. Jimmy Carter took inspiration from his ideas about love and justice, and Barack Obama has praised him as one of his favorite philosophers. His theories have also influenced neoconservatives, many of whom cited his work to support the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet, Niebuhr never published a single, comprehensive book on his approach to international relations, and, because he was so prolific, one would have to sift through volumes of his work to try to construct such a unified vision. This book distills Niebuhr's disparate and heretofore difficult-to-access work on international relations into one concise and accessible volume. Drawing from the well-springs of Niebuhr's Christian social thought, the volume explores the depths of Niebuhr's views on human nature, race, collective life, U.S. foreign policy, Just War Theory, Cold War era containment, globalization, and the U.N. It then applies his approach to contemporary foreign policy issues such as the 2003 Iraq War, the Responsibility to Protect, and the rise of China. The book also considers Niebuhr's contribution to IR theory and contextualizes it in the present day revival of classical Realism with a multivariate, existentialist twist. Ultimately, the book asserts that Niebuhr's notion of a fallible, self-interested view of human nature, his dialectical approach, and a related moral dualism run throughout his work on politics and international relations as they did through the rest of his work.

The Oxford Handbook of International Relations offers the most authoritative and comprehensive overview to date of the field of international relations. Arguably the most impressive collection of international relations scholars ever brought together within one volume, the Handbook debates the nature of the field itself, critically engages with the major theories, surveys a wide spectrum of methods, addresses the relationship between scholarship and policy making, and examines the field's relation with cognate disciplines. The Handbook takes as its central themes the interaction between empirical and normative inquiry that permeates all theorizing in the field and the way in which contending approaches have shaped one another. In doing so, the Handbook provides an authoritative and critical introduction to the subject and establishes a sense of the field as a dynamic realm of argument and inquiry. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations will be essential reading for all of those interested in the advanced study of global politics and international affairs.

The end of the Cold War was a "big bang" reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the world wars in 1919 and 1945. But what do states that win wars do with their newfound power, and how do they use it to build order? In *After Victory*, John Ikenberry examines postwar settlements in modern history, arguing that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power. He explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions—both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power—has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit "constitutional" characteristics. Blending comparative politics with

international relations, and history with theory, *After Victory* will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today.

From acclaimed political scientist Diana Mutz, a revealing look at why people's attitudes on trade differ from their own self-interest *Winners and Losers* challenges conventional wisdom about how American citizens form opinions on international trade. While dominant explanations in economics emphasize personal self-interest—and whether individuals gain or lose financially as a result of trade—this book takes a psychological approach, demonstrating how people view the complex world of international trade through the lens of interpersonal relations. Drawing on psychological theories of preference formation as well as original surveys and experiments, Diana Mutz finds that in contrast to the economic view of trade as cooperation for mutual benefit, many Americans view trade as a competition between the United States and other countries—a contest of us versus them. These people favor trade as long as they see Americans as the "winners" in these interactions, viewing trade as a way to establish dominance over foreign competitors. For others, trade is a means of maintaining more peaceful relations between countries. Just as individuals may exchange gifts to cement relationships, international trade is a tie that binds nations together in trust and cooperation. *Winners and Losers* reveals how people's orientations toward in-groups and out-groups play a central role in influencing how they think about trade with foreign countries, and shows how a better understanding of the psychological underpinnings of public opinion can lead to lasting economic and societal benefits.

A major theoretical statement by a distinguished political scholar explains why a policy of liberal hegemony is doomed to fail It is widely believed in the West that the United States should spread liberal democracy across the world, foster an open international economy, and build international institutions. The policy of remaking the world in America's image is supposed to protect human rights, promote peace, and make the world safe for democracy. But this is not what has happened. Instead, the United States has become a highly militarized state fighting wars that undermine peace, harm human rights, and threaten liberal values at home. In this major statement, the renowned international-relations scholar John Mearsheimer argues that liberal hegemony--the foreign policy pursued by the United States since the Cold War ended--is doomed to fail. It makes far more sense, he maintains, for Washington to adopt a more restrained foreign policy based on a sound understanding of how nationalism and realism constrain great powers abroad. *The Great Delusion* is a lucid and compelling work of the first importance for scholars, policymakers, and everyone interested in the future of American foreign policy.

Written by leading scholars in the field, *Causes of War* provides the first comprehensive analysis of the leading theories relating to the origins of both interstate and civil wars. Utilizes historical examples to illustrate individual theories throughout Includes an analysis of theories of civil wars as well as interstate wars -- one of the only texts to do both Written by two former International Studies Association Presidents

Explaining why some states seek the status quo and others seek revision in international relations, Davidson argues that governments pursuing revisionist policies are responding to powerful domestic groups, such as nationalists and those in the

military, that believe they can defeat their rivals. He draws on examples of France, Italy and Great Britain to enhance understanding of a fundamental source of instability in international affairs.

The Russian-Israeli intersections in the Middle East sway sometime from being distinctly pragmatic to peculiar arenas when it comes to the ongoing Syrian conflict. Through adopting the lens of Neoclassical Realism as a theory of international relations, this paper demonstrates how the Syrian conflict - due to its importance to both Israel and Russia - leads both countries to participate in positional competition in the region, engage in limited but effective cooperation, and try to stem the erosion of state-centric governance. The unique ties between the two countries in terms of their religious and ethnic composition further underpin these activities, and how they translate into a particular decision-making process down to the domestic level. The controversial, yet pragmatic approaches of the two countries, often associated with the “iron fist” policies of both Netanyahu’s and Putin’s statecraft, are reflective of a distinct mixture of domestic homogeneity and vertical leadership-centered power aggregation, blended with military boldness in the constant quest for security.

This volume analyzes the decisions that major powers have made since the Cold War to adapt to a rapidly changing economic and security environment. The authors acknowledge that, while great power wars are now unlikely, positional conflicts over resources and markets still remain.

Since the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union, many scholars have argued that the balance of power theory is losing its relevance. This text examines this viewpoint, as well as looking at systematic factors that may hinder or favour the return of balance of power politics.

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