

## Al Qaeda The Islamic State And The Global Jihadist Movement What Everyone Needs To Knowi 1 2

In *Road Warriors*, terrorism expert Daniel Byman traces the history of the jihadist foreign fighter movement. Through the biographies of key figures and histories of the groups, Byman chronicles the movement's birth in Afghanistan, growing pains in Bosnia and Chechnya, and emergence as a major terrorism scourge behind not only 9/11, but also attacks in Paris, Madrid, and beyond. He details the foreign fighters' role in Iraq after the 2003 U.S. overthrow of Saddam's regime and the impact of their mistakes. Foreign fighters reached their apogee in Syria during the nation's civil war, effectively combatting the Assad regime, the United States, and other foes on behalf of the Islamic State, one of the deadliest terrorist groups the world has known. Some fighters died in the first conflict zone they entered, while others became professional fighters, going from one war to the next. Still others sought to return home, some to peaceful retirement but a deadly few to conduct terrorist attacks. Both the United States and Europe have suffered and adapted as foreign fighter movements have evolved. Before 9/11, volunteers were able to go to and from Afghanistan and other hotspots with little interference. Today, the United States and its allies have developed a global program to identify, arrest, and kill foreign fighters. Much remains to be done, however - jihadist ideas and networks are by now deeply embedded, even as groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State rise and fall.

The Islamic State, known as ISIS, exploded into the public eye in 2014 with startling speed and shocking brutality. It has captured the imagination of the global jihadist movement, attracting recruits in unprecedented numbers and wreaking bloody destruction with a sadistic glee that has alienated even the hardcore terrorists of its parent organization, al Qaeda. Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, two of America's leading experts on terrorism, dissect the new model for violent extremism that ISIS has leveraged into an empire of death in Iraq and Syria, and an international network that is rapidly expanding in the Middle East, North Africa and around the world. *ISIS: The State of Terror* traces the ideological innovations that the group deploys to recruit unprecedented numbers of Westerners, the composition of its infamous snuff videos, and the technological tools it exploits on social media to broadcast its atrocities, and its recruiting pitch to the world, including its success at attracting thousands of Western adherents. The authors examine ISIS's predatory abuse of women and children and its use of horror to manipulate world leaders and its own adherents as it builds its twisted society. The authors offer a much-needed perspective on how world leaders should prioritize and respond to ISIS's deliberate and insidious provocations.

Contents: (1) Introduction: Al Qaeda: Statements 1994-2001: Founding Principles; Declaration of Jihad; Clash of Civilizations; (2) Al Qaeda Post-9/11; The Goals of the New York Strike; Al Qaeda Statements in 2004-2007; Outreach and 'Truce' Proposals; Iraq and Al Qaeda's Ideology; Strategic Perspectives; Tactical Differences?; Iraq and Al Qaeda's Regional Ambitions; The Islamic State of Iraq and Discord; Political Goals and Perspectives on Reform; The Three Foundations; Al Qaeda on Democracy and Reform; Strategic Framework; Targeting Israel; The Importance of Oil; (3) Implications and Conclusion: Al Qaeda's Audiences; Pragmatic Messianism; Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International.

Providing up-to-date information for general readers as well as those well-informed about the Islamic State, this book offers an essential understanding of the rise of ISIS and its current influence in the Middle East as well as worldwide. • Presents the information necessary to understand ISIS: who they are, what they want, and why they represent such a unique problem to counteract • Provides readers with the understanding of the problems in the Middle East that created ISIS and enable it to continue to exist • Supplies accurate, insightful perspectives from a Western author who lived for nearly nine years in the Middle East fighting, studying, and advising on ISIS and similar organizations

This book focuses on the crises facing Al Qaeda and how the mass killing of Muslims is challenging its credibility as a leader among Islamist jihadist organizations. The book argues that these crises are directly related to Al Qaeda's affiliation with the extreme violence employed against Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the decade since 9/11. Al Qaeda's public and private responses to this violence differ greatly. While in public Al Qaeda has justified those attacks declaring that, for the establishment of a state of 'true believers', they are a necessary evil, in private Al Qaeda has been advising its local affiliates to refrain from killing Muslims. To better understand the crises facing Al Qaeda, the book explores the development of Central Al Qaeda's complex relationship with radical (mis)appropriations and manifestations of takfir, which allows one Muslim to declare another an unbeliever, and its unique relationship with each of its affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author then goes on to consider how the prominence of takfir is contributing to the deteriorating security in those countries and how this is affecting Al Qaeda's credibility as an Islamist terror organization. The book concludes by considering the long-term viability of Al Qaeda and how its demise could allow the rise of the even more radical, violent Islamic State and the implications this has for the future security of the Middle East, North Africa and Central/South Asia. This book will be of much interest to students of political violence and terrorism, Islamism, global security and IR.

This work is the fourth *Small Wars Journal* anthology focusing on radical Sunni Islamic terrorists and insurgent groups. It covers this professional journals writings for 2016 and is a compliment to the earlier *Global Radical Islamist Insurgency* anthologies that were produced as Vol. I: 2007-2011 (published in 2015) and Vol. II: 2012-2014 (published in 2016) and *Jihadi Terrorism, Insurgency, and the Islamic State* spanning 2015 (published in 2017). This anthology, which offers well over six hundred pages of focused analysis, follows the same general conceptual breakdown as the earlier works and is divided into two major thematic sections one focusing on al-Qaeda and Islamic state activities in 2016 and the other focusing on US Allied policies and counterinsurgent strategies.

What does ISIS really want? This is the definitive account of the strategy, psychology, and fundamentalism driving the Islamic State. NAMED ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS • "Worthy of Joseph Conrad . . . gripping, sobering and revelatory."—Tom Holland, *New Statesman* The Islamic State inspired a wave of true believers to travel to Syria from Europe, America, and the Middle East, in numbers not seen since the Crusades. What compelled tens of thousands of men and women to leave comfortable, privileged lives to join a death cult in the desert? Steven Pinker called Graeme Wood's analysis of this phenomenon in *The Atlantic* "fascinating, terrifying, occasionally blackly humorous." In *The Way of the Strangers*, Wood uses character study, analysis, and original reporting to take us further into the Islamic State's apocalyptic vision. Though the Islamic State has lost territory, it threatens to rise again, and its followers are plotting on every continent. From the streets of Cairo to the mosques of London, Wood meets with supporters, recruiters, and scholars and asks them why they believe that killing and dying

for this cause is the only path to Paradise. With a new afterword, *The Way of the Strangers* uncovers the theology and emotional appeal of this resilient group and explores its idiosyncratic, coherent approach to Islam. Just as Lawrence Wright's *The Looming Tower* explained the rise of Al Qaida, this book will shape our understanding of a new and deadlier generation of terrorists. Praise for *The Way of the Strangers* "The Way of the Strangers represents journalism at its best: vivid writing, indefatigable legwork, and fearless analysis."—Robert D. Kaplan, author of *The Return of Marco Polo's World* "Wood is a brilliant analyst and storyteller, and his firsthand reporting and language abilities make him the most reliable commentator on the Islamic State that I have read. His wit matches his intelligence ('Well-behaved Salafis seldom make history')—you don't get through any two pages in his book without a good laugh."—Peter Theroux, author of *Sandstorms: Days and Nights in Arabia* "Excruciatingly well observed and devastatingly honest . . . This is the first and only book about the Islamic State to expose, explain, and ultimately undermine its ideology with the relentless irony that comes from blending deep knowledge with hands-on experience. Wood makes it impossible not to laugh, despite the horrors."—Elisabeth Kendall, senior research fellow in Arabic and Islamic studies, University of Oxford

In 2014, the declaration of the Islamic State caliphate was hailed as a major victory by the global jihadist movement. But it was short-lived. Three years on, the caliphate was destroyed, leaving its surviving fighters – many of whom were foreign recruits – to retreat and scatter across the globe. So what happens now? Is this the beginning of the end of IS? Or can it adapt and regroup after the physical fall of the caliphate? In this timely analysis, terrorism expert Colin P. Clarke takes stock of IS – its roots, its evolution, and its monumental setbacks – to assess the road ahead. The caliphate, he argues, was an anomaly. The future of the global jihadist movement will look very much like its past – with peripatetic and divided groups of militants dispersing to new battlefields, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, where they will join existing civil wars, establish safe havens and sanctuaries, and seek ways of conducting spectacular attacks in the West that inspire new followers. In this fragmented and atomized form, Clarke cautions, IS could become even more dangerous and challenging for counterterrorism forces, as its splinter groups threaten renewed and heightened violence across the globe.

This anthology—the second of an initial two volume set—specifically covers *Small Wars Journal* writings on Al Qaeda and the Islamic State spanning the years 2012-2014. This set is meant to contribute to U.S. security debates focusing on radical Islamist global insurgency by collecting diverse SWJ essays into more easily accessible formats. *Small Wars Journal* has long been a leader in insurgency and counterinsurgency research and scholarship with an emphasis on practical applications and policy outcomes in furtherance of U.S. global and allied nation strategic interests. The site is able to lay claim to supporting the writings of many COIN (counterinsurgency) practitioners. This includes Dr. David Kilcullen whose early work dating from late 2004 "Countering Global Insurgency" helped to lay much of the conceptual basis focusing on this threat and as a result greatly helped to facilitate the writings that were later incorporated into these Al Qaeda and Islamic State focused anthologies. This volume is composed of sixty-six chapters divided into sections on a) radical Islamist OPFORs (opposition forces) and context and b) U.S.—allied policy and counter radical Islamist strategies. The work also contains a preface by Matt Begert, a foreword by Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, an introduction, a postscript, an extensive notes section, and editor and contributor biographies on sixty-four individuals as well as an acronyms listing and an initial 'About SWJ' and foundation section.

The so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, has inspired young men and women all over the world to commit horrible atrocities in its name. How has the Islamic State surpassed al-Qaeda to become the most popular jihadist group on the planet? Its goal is not only to revive the Islamic empire but also usher in the End of Times - a final battle that will restore the Muslim community to its medieval glory days. And they will not stop until they achieve their mission.

Ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, fighters from abroad have journeyed in ever-greater numbers to conflict zones in the Muslim world to defend Islam from-in their view- infidels and apostates. The phenomenon recently reached its apogee in Syria, where the foreign fighter population quickly became larger and more diverse than in any previous conflict. In *Road Warriors*, Daniel Byman provides a sweeping history of the jihadist foreign fighter movement. He begins by chronicling the movement's birth in Afghanistan, its growing pains in Bosnia and Chechnya, and its emergence as a major source of terrorism in the West in the 1990s, culminating in the 9/11 attacks. Since that bloody day, the foreign fighter movement has seen major ups and downs. It rode high after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, when the ultra-violent Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) attracted thousands of foreign fighters. AQI overreached, however, and suffered a crushing defeat. Demonstrating the resilience of the movement, however, AQI reemerged anew during the Syrian civil war as the Islamic State, attracting tens of thousands of fighters from around the world and spawning the bloody 2015 attacks in Paris among hundreds of other strikes. Although casualty rates are usually high, the survivors of Afghanistan, Syria, and other fields of jihad often became skilled professional warriors, going from one war to the next. Still others returned to their home countries, some to peaceful retirement but a deadly few to conduct terrorist attacks. Over time, both the United States and Europe have learned to adapt. Before 9/11, volunteers went to and fro to Afghanistan and other hotspots with little interference. Today, the United States and its allies have developed a global program to identify, arrest, and kill foreign fighters. Much remains to be done, however-jihadist ideas and networks are by now deeply embedded, even as groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State rise and fall. And as Byman makes abundantly clear, the problem is not likely to go away any time soon.

The eruption of the anti-Assad revolution in Syria has had many unintended consequences, among which is the opportunity it offered Sunni jihadists to establish a foothold in the heart of the Middle East. That Syria's ongoing civil war is so brutal and protracted has only compounded the situation, as have developments in Iraq and Lebanon. Ranging across the battlefields and international borders have been dozens of jihadi Islamist fighting groups, of which some coalesced into significant factions such as Jabhat al Nusra and the Islamic State. This book assesses and explains the emergence since 2011 of Sunni jihadist organizations in Syria's fledgling insurgency, charts their evolution and situates them within the global Islamist project. Unprecedented numbers of foreign fighters have joined such groups, who will almost certainly continue to host them. Thus, external factors in their emergence are scrutinized, including the strategic

and tactical lessons learned from other jihadist conflict zones and the complex interplay between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and how it has influenced the jihadist sphere in Syria. Tensions between and conflict within such groups also feature in this indispensable volume.

In the first chapter of this book, we will shed light on al-Qaeda since its foundation at the hands of Abdullah Azzam, who assumed top positions within the Brotherhood Muslim, and how it was intellectually and dynamically developed during Usama bin Laden's era, when Al-Qaeda was active in the Taliban's areas of influence in Afghanistan. This chapter will tackle reasons for Al-Qaeda apocalypse following the September 11 attacks, especially after the death of Usama bin Laden and his replacement by Ayman al-Zawahiri. \*\*\*\* The four-part second chapter will take on the emergence of Al-Qaeda-offshoot ISIS at the hands of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi under the name "Al Qaeda in Iraq" before being turned into "the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant". It will also shed light on the declaration of the "Caliphate State" by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the fight between ISIS and "Al-Nusra Front" to gain control over the Syrian territory. The chapter will discuss in detail the conflict between Al-Qaeda and ISIS over the areas of influence in the Maghreb and West Africa. \*\*\*\* The third chapter reviews the Egyptian government's war on Al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorist groups in Sinai as well as coordination between terrorist groups and the Brotherhood group in Egypt, Syria and Libya. \*\*\* The fourth chapter tackles the Western-American plans to divide the Middle East, including "Bernard Lewis" plan, as well as the "Creative Chaos" theory and the Greater Middle East project, especially after the Arab Spring revolutions. The role of Islamist currents, including moderate and radical one, as well as the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in implementing the American vision will be discussed in this chapter as well. In the same context, the chapter will highlight the role assigned to Qatar as an "agent" to implement the American plan, in coordination with the Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist groups in the region.

"When he succeeded his father in 1999, King Abdullah of Jordan released a batch of political prisoners in the hopes of smoothing his transition to power. Little did he know that among those released was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a man who would go on to become a terrorist mastermind too dangerous even for al-Qaeda and give rise to an Islamist movement bent on dominating the Middle East. Zarqawi began by directing hotel bombings and assassinations in Jordan from a base in northern Iraq, but it was the American invasion of that country in 2003 that catapulted him to the head of a vast insurgency. By identifying him as the link between Saddam and bin Laden, the CIA inadvertently created a monster. Like-minded radicals saw him as a hero resisting the infidel occupiers and rallied to his cause. Their wave of brutal beheadings and suicide bombings continued for years until Jordanian intelligence provided the Americans with the crucial intelligence needed to eliminate Zarqawi in a 2006 airstrike. But his movement endured, first called al-Qaeda in Iraq, then renamed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, seeking refuge in unstable, ungoverned pockets on the Iraq-Syria border. And as the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, ISIS seized its chance to pursue Zarqawi's dream of a sweeping, ultra-conservative Islamic caliphate. Drawing on unique access to CIA and Jordanian sources, Joby Warrick weaves together heart-pounding, moment-by-moment operational details with overarching historical perspectives to reveal the long trajectory of today's most dangerous Islamic extremist threat"--

Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Contents: Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine The Al-Qaeda Organization Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy Sunni-Salafism/"Fundamentalism" The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/Salafi-Wahhabism Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi The "Base of the Jihad"; Al-Qaeda From Qa'idat Al-Jihad to Bin Ladenism From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa'idat Al-Jihad Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad "What is Qa'idat Al-Jihad?" In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn III. Islamic State Organization "Zarqawism" vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006 From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999 Al-Zarqawi's Private Jihassist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004 The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's "Caliphate": From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational History Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: The Caliphate Now! The "Final Solution" to the "Shia Problem" Terrorist Modus Operandi Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis The Al-Qaeda Organization The "Classical" Base First Bin Ladenist Lone Mujahid" "Far Enemy" Strategy Islamic State Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Key Findings Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQ and its Affiliates Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the IS

An incisive narrative history of the Islamic State, from the 2005 master plan to reestablish the Caliphate to its quest for Final Victory in 2020 Given how quickly its operations have achieved global impact, it may seem that the Islamic State materialized suddenly. In fact, al-Qaeda's operations chief, Sayf al-Adl, devised a seven-stage plan for jihadis to conquer the world by 2020 that included reestablishing the Caliphate in Syria between 2013 and 2016. Despite a massive schism between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, al-Adl's plan has proved remarkably prescient. In summer 2014, ISIS declared itself the Caliphate after capturing Mosul, Iraq—part of stage five in al-Adl's plan. Drawing on large troves of recently declassified documents captured from the Islamic State and its predecessors, counterterrorism expert Brian Fishman tells the story of this organization's complex and largely hidden past—and what the master plan suggests about its future. Only by understanding the Islamic State's full history—and the strategy that drove it—can we understand the contradictions that may ultimately tear it apart.

An expert on terrorism and an expert on counterterrorism answer the two questions everyone is asking about the rise of terrorism today: why is this happening, and when will it end? Since the death of bin Laden in 2011, ISIS has risen, al-Qaeda has expanded its reach, and right-

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wing extremists have surged in the United States for the same simple reason: terrorism works. It's not caused by psychosis or irrationality, as the media often suggests. Instead, it's terrifyingly logical. Violent acts produce political results. To show why, Laqueur and Wall explore the history, rationales and precepts of terrorism, from the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, through the terror campaigns by Irish and Indian nationalists, and to the Nazis and Italian Fascists. To explain why terror is on the rise again, they show how the American invasion of Iraq created the conditions for the emergence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, part of which metastasized into ISIS, while Russia's increasing intervention in Syria allowed both of the organizations to evolve. The Future of Terrorism brings reason to a topic usually ruled by fear. Laqueur and Wall show the structural features behind contemporary terrorism: how bad governance abets terror; the link between poverty and terrorism; why religious terrorism is more dangerous than secular; and the nature of supposed "lone wolf" terrorists. Fear alone provides no tools to combat the future of terrorism. This book does.

"Anyone who wants to understand the world we live in now should read this book." —Lawrence Wright To eliminate the scourge of terrorism, we must first know who the enemy actually is, and what his motivations are. In *Anatomy of Terror*, former FBI special agent and New York Times best-selling author Ali Soufan dissects Osama bin Laden's brand of jihadi terrorism and its major offshoots, revealing how these organizations were formed, how they operate, their strengths, and—crucially—their weaknesses. This riveting account examines the new Islamic radicalism through the stories of its flag-bearers, including a U.S. Air Force colonel who once served Saddam Hussein, a provincial bookworm who declared himself caliph of all Muslims, and bin Laden's own beloved son Hamza, a prime candidate to lead the organization his late father founded. *Anatomy of Terror* lays bare the psychology and inner workings of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their spawn, and shows how the spread of terror can be stopped. Winner of the Airey Neave Memorial Book Prize

The Islamic State is one of the most lethal and successful jihadist groups in modern history, surpassing even al-Qaeda. Thousands of its followers have marched across Syria and Iraq, subjugating millions, enslaving women, beheading captives, and daring anyone to stop them. Thousands more have spread terror beyond the Middle East under the Islamic State's black flag. How did the Islamic State attract so many followers and conquer so much land? By being more ruthless, more apocalyptic, and more devoted to state-building than its competitors. The shrewd leaders of the Islamic State combined two of the most powerful yet contradictory ideas in Islam—the return of the Islamic Empire and the end of the world—into a mission and a message that shapes its strategy and inspires its army of zealous fighters. They have defied conventional thinking about how to wage wars and win recruits. Even if the Islamic State is defeated, jihadist terrorism will never be the same. Based almost entirely on primary sources in Arabic—including ancient religious texts and secret al-Qaeda and Islamic State letters that few have seen - William McCants' *The ISIS Apocalypse* explores how religious fervor, strategic calculation, and doomsday prophecy shaped the Islamic State's past and foreshadow its dark future.

This book focuses on the crises facing Al Qaeda and how the mass killing of Muslims is challenging its credibility as a leader among Islamist jihadist organizations. The book argues that these crises are directly related to Al Qaeda's affiliation with the extreme violence employed against Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the decade since 9/11. Al Qaeda's public and private responses to this violence differ greatly. While in public Al Qaeda has justified those attacks declaring that, for the establishment of a state of 'true believers', they are a necessary evil, in private Al Qaeda has been advising its local affiliates to refrain from killing Muslims. To better understand the crises facing Al Qaeda, the book explores the development of Central Al Qaeda's complex relationship with radical (mis)appropriations and manifestations of takfir, which allows one Muslim to declare another an unbeliever, and its unique relationship with each of its affiliates in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author then goes on to consider how the prominence of takfir is contributing to the deteriorating security in those countries and how this is affecting Al Qaeda's credibility as an Islamist terror organization. The book concludes by considering the long-term viability of Al Qaeda and how its demise could allow the rise of the even more radical, violent Islamic State and the implications this has for the future security of the Middle East, North Africa and Central/South Asia. This book will be of much interest to students of political violence and terrorism, Islamism, global security and IR.

Looking to the future in confronting the Islamic State The Islamic State (best known in the West as ISIS or ISIL) has been active for less than a decade, but it has already been the subject of numerous histories and academic studies—all focus primarily on the past. *The Future of ISIS* is the first major study to look ahead: what are the prospects for the Islamic State in the near term, and what can the global community, including the United States, do to counter it? Edited by two distinguished scholars at Indiana University, the book examines how ISIS will affect not only the Middle East but the global order. Specific chapters deal with such questions as whether and how ISIS benefitted from intelligence failures, and what can be done to correct any such failures; how to confront the alarmingly broad appeal of Islamic State ideology; the role of local and regional actors in confronting ISIS; and determining U.S. interests in preventing ISIS from gaining influence and controlling territory. Given the urgency of the topic, *The Future of ISIS* is of interest to policymakers, analysts, and students of international affairs and public policy.

Of the 18,814 deaths caused by terrorists around the world last year, well over half were due to the actions of just four groups: al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, the Nusra Front, and Boko Haram. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the world has struggled to define al-Qaeda, an amorphous, growing, and seemingly inexhaustible organization. Once a relatively organized group based in one country with a defined hierarchy and clear leadership, al-Qaeda has transformed into a transnational phenomenon over the last few decades, with branches and affiliates operating in dozens of countries across the world. Many call al-Qaeda an enemy, while some define it as an ideology, and others analyze it as a network. Of course, a small minority takes it up as their cause and an extension of their religion...

An insider's account of the often-fraught U.S.-Saudi relationship Saudi Arabia and the United States have been partners since 1943, when President Roosevelt met with two future Saudi monarchs. Subsequent U.S. presidents have had direct relationships with those kings and their successors—setting the tone for a special partnership between an absolute monarchy with a unique Islamic identity and the world's most powerful democracy. Although based in large part on economic interests, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has rarely been smooth. Differences over Israel have caused friction since the early days, and ambiguities about Saudi involvement—or lack of it—in the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States continue to haunt the relationship. Now, both countries have new, still-to-be-tested leaders in President Trump and King Salman. Bruce Riedel for decades has followed these kings and presidents during his career at the CIA, the White House, and Brookings. This book offers an insider's account of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, with unique insights. Using declassified documents, memoirs by both Saudis and Americans, and eyewitness accounts, this book takes the reader inside the royal palaces, the holy cities, and the White House to gain an understanding of this complex partnership.

\*Includes pictures \*Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the world has struggled to define al-Qaeda, an amorphous, growing, and seemingly inexhaustible organization. Once a relatively organized group based in one country with a defined hierarchy and clear leadership, al-Qaeda has transformed into a transnational phenomenon over the last few decades, with branches and affiliates operating in dozens of countries across the world. Many call al-Qaeda an enemy, while some define it as an ideology, and others analyze it as a network. Of course, a small minority takes it up as their cause and an extension of their religion. Also known as ISIS, Da'esh, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and a host of other names, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has increasingly gained attention over the years for its brutal tactics and seemingly blatant disregard for human rights, but it has recently dominated the global media spotlight and made headlines when it attacked and seized control of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, and drove out an Iraqi army force that was more than five times its size in June 2014. It has since laid claim to various territories throughout Iraq

and the Levant, and it has established operational control and maintained administrative structures on both sides of the Iraqi-Syrian border. Most recently, it declared the restoration of a caliphate and renamed itself the Islamic State. One of the reasons ISIS has gone by so many different names is because it has rebranded itself numerous times in the past. After starting as an al-Qaeda-inspired Sunni Islamist brigade that emerged from the ashes of the jihadist struggle against foreign forces in Iraq, the group grew into a full-fledged al-Qaeda branch, then evolved into a religiously motivated army, then finally separated from al-Qaeda to become the organization it is today. Since the Arab Spring uprising of 2011, reports of terrorist attacks around the world have flooded international media. Syria, a country about one and half times the size of Texas, has become the central battleground for many terrorist groups; those the world often focuses on and has heard much of--such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as ISIS and Da'ash, but from here on referred to as ISIL)--and those the world rarely hears about and is unable to make distinctions between others--such as Jabhat Al-Nusra. Despite the lack of focused attention on its activities, Jabhat Al-Nusra (or, the Nusra Front as it is sometimes referred to) has built quite a reputation in Syria and the greater Middle East for its seemingly endless supply of weapons, ability to ally with strategic partners, and its peculiar mix of international, albeit notorious, supporters inside the country. The complexity of the Syrian Civil War is most definitely reflected in the complexity of the groups fighting for power within and around its borders; Jabhat Al-Nusra is no exception. The group's relationship with ISIL, Al-Qaeda, and the other militant factions within Syria is complicated and appears often conflictual: as of the time of this writing, Jabhat Al-Nusra had announced its split from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but analysts believe this is nothing more than a re-branding technique to attract all fighting elements in Syria to be under its own umbrella of control. On the morning of April 15, 2004, the world woke up to the extraordinary news of the kidnap in a little known hamlet of Nigeria of some 276, primarily Christian schoolgirls, by the radical militant Nigerian insurgent group Boko Haram. Almost overnight, the group, which had resided somewhat on the fringes of global consciousness up until that point, found itself at the forefront as international public outrage, culminating in a social media campaign headed by First Lady Michelle Obama, demanded the immediate return of the kidnapped girls.

Counter Jihad provides a sweeping account of America's military campaigns in the Islamic world and fills a gaping void in our understanding of the War on Terror.

Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh) stunned the world when it overran an area the size of Great Britain on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border in a matter of weeks and proclaimed the birth of a new Caliphate. In this timely and important book, Abdel Bari Atwan draws on his unrivaled knowledge of the global jihadi movement and Middle Eastern geopolitics to reveal the origins and modus operandi of Islamic State. Based on extensive field research and exclusive interviews with IS insiders, Islamic State outlines the group's leadership structure, as well as its strategies, tactics, and diverse methods of recruitment. Atwan traces the Salafi-jihadi lineage of IS, its ideological differences with al Qaeda and the deadly rivalry that has emerged between their leaders. He also shows how the group's rapid growth has been facilitated by its masterful command of social media platforms, the "dark web," Hollywood blockbuster-style videos, and even jihadi computer games, producing a powerful paradox where the ambitions of the Middle Ages have reemerged in cyberspace. As Islamic State continues to dominate the world's media headlines with horrific acts of ruthless violence, Atwan considers the movement's chances of survival and expansion and offers indispensable insights on potential government responses to contain the IS threat.

The rise of international jihad and Western ultra-nationalism In the Management of Savagery, Max Blumenthal excavates the real story behind America's dealings with the world and shows how the extremist forces that now threaten peace across the globe are the inevitable flowering of America's imperial designs. Washington's secret funding of the mujahedin provoked the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With guns and money, the United States has ever since sustained the extremists, including Osama Bin Laden, who have become its enemies. The Pentagon has trained and armed jihadist elements in Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya; it has launched military interventions to change regimes in the Middle East. In doing so, it created fertile ground for the Islamic State and brought foreign conflicts home to American soil. These failed wars abroad have made the United States more vulnerable to both terrorism as well as native ultra-nationalism. The Trump presidency is the inevitable consequence of neoconservative imperialism in the post-Cold War age. Trump's dealings in the Middle East are likely only to exacerbate the situation.

Terrorist groups with a shared enemy or ideology have ample reason to work together, even if they are primarily pursuing different causes. Although partnering with another terrorist organization has the potential to bolster operational effectiveness, efficiency, and prestige, international alliances may expose partners to infiltration, security breaches, or additional counterterrorism attention. Alliances between such organizations, which are suspicious and secretive by nature, must also overcome significant barriers to trust—the exposure to risk must be balanced by the promise of increased lethality, resiliency, and longevity. In *Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances*, Tricia Bacon argues that although it may seem natural for terrorist groups to ally, groups actually face substantial hurdles when attempting to ally and, when alliances do form, they are not evenly distributed across pairs. Instead, she demonstrates that when terrorist groups seek allies to obtain new skills, knowledge, or capacities for resource acquisition and mobilization, only a few groups have the ability to provide needed training, safe haven, infrastructure, or cachet. Consequently, these select few emerge as preferable partners and become hubs around which other groups cluster. According to Bacon, shared enemies and common ideologies do not cause alliances to form but create affinity to bind partners and guide partner selection. Bacon examines partnerships formed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Al-Qaida, and Egyptian jihadist groups, among others, in a series of case studies spanning the dawn of international terrorism in the 1960s to the present. *Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances* advances our understanding of the motivations of terrorist alliances and offers insights useful to counterterrorism efforts to disrupt these dangerous relationships.

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#1 bestselling author and radio host Glenn Beck exposes the real truth behind the roots of Islamic extremism in Muslim teachings in this sharply insightful handbook that debunks commonly held assumptions about Islam and the dream of a renewed caliphate. From the barbarians of ISIS to the terror tactics of Al-Qaeda and its offshoots, to the impending threat of a nuclear Iran, those motivated by extreme fundamentalist Islamic faith have the power to endanger and kill millions.

The conflict with them will not end until we face the truth about those who find their inspiration and justification in the religion itself. Drawing on quotes from the Koran and the hadith, as well as from leaders of ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood, Glenn Beck seeks to expose the true origins of Islamic extremism as well as the deadly theological motivations behind these agencies of destruction. Using the same unique no-holds-barred style from his bestselling books *Control and Conform*, Glenn Beck offers straight facts and history about the fundamental beliefs that inspire so many to kill.

This fascinating report was issued in March 2019. The volume of extreme Islamic-inspired attacks in France in 2012-2016, the hundreds of French foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State's ruthless violence in the Levant, and the low level of assimilation to mainstream French culture by young French Muslims have quickly become major concerns for the security and stability of France. The French Republic is a European sovereign nation with inclusive immigration policies, an active proponent of full assimilation for minorities and immigrants, and a non-participant in the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The French government and the nation's citizens therefore did not anticipate this spate of jihadist terrorism. This thesis investigates the large-scale terror attacks, including the backgrounds and motivations of the perpetrators, and then assesses relevant analytical explanations by prominent French scholars of the increase in religion-inspired violence in France in 2012-2016. These scholars' views differ on the origins of radicalization and terrorist behavior, and notably in regard to the role of religion in terms of social alienation and marginalization. By neutralizing the disruptive message at the source, deradicalizing the French prison system, and properly censoring the online channels of manpower recruitment, the French government can enhance its ability to prevent the infection of today's youth by this radical doctrine of salvation. This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. A new era of terror in France began in 2012 when a French citizen with ethnic ties to North Africa went on a killing spree in the south of the country. The subsequent sequence of attacks illustrated a new and more sinister level of religious-inspired violence in the French homeland. Homegrown extremists, born and raised or naturalized and inculcated into French culture and society conducted these attacks. These attacks, exceptionally violent and claimed by known terrorist organizations, sent a shockwave of terror into the heart of the French Republic. Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) enthusiastically applauded and emphatically claimed these unprecedented and sadistically vicious attacks. The violence escalated dramatically in January 2015, when three French citizens conducted a well-coordinated assault against the satire magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Each of these Frenchmen-radical extremists-fought to his death against local law enforcement. Later that same year, the violence escalated yet again. The terrorist attacks on the Stade de France and the Bataclan Concert Hall in Paris represented a new level of violence, one not witnessed in France since the Nazi occupation of World War II. The violence reached its zenith in 2016 with the catastrophic attack directed against the crowds gathering to celebrate Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in the southern French city of Nice. When all these large-scale and religiously inspired terrorist attacks concluded, jihadists were responsible for taking the lives of more than 247 people and injuring more than 800. These homegrown terrorists, responsible for the large-scale jihadi violence in France from 2012 to 2016, represented a new demographic of terrorism, a younger population of French citizens responsible for committing Islamic-inspired violence against their own government.

Several "pieces first published in *The New Yorker* recall the path terror in the Middle East has taken from the rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s to the recent beheadings of reporters and aid workers by ISIS ... They include an ... impression of Saudi Arabia, a kingdom of silence under the control of the religious police; the Syrian film industry, then compliant at the edges but already exuding a feeling of the barely masked fury that erupted into civil war; [and] the 2006-11 Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza, a study in disparate values of human lives. Others continue to look into al-Qaeda as it forms a master plan for its future, experiences a rebellion from within the organization, and spins off a growing web of terror in the world"--

Founded as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda achieved a degree of international notoriety with a series of spectacular attacks in the 1990s; however, it was the dramatic assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 that truly launched Al Qaeda onto the global stage. The attacks endowed the organization with world-historical importance and provoked an overwhelming counterattack by the United States and other western countries. Within a year of 9/11, the core of Al Qaeda had been chased out of Afghanistan and into a variety of refuges across the Muslim world. Splinter groups and franchised offshoots were active in the 2000s in countries like Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen, but by early 2011, after more than a decade of relentless counterterrorism efforts by the United States and other Western military and intelligence services, most felt that Al Qaeda's moment had passed.

The al-Qaeda Franchise asks why al-Qaeda adopted a branching-out strategy, introducing seven franchises spread over the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. After all, transnational terrorist organizations can expand through other organizational strategies. Forming franchises was not an inevitable outgrowth of al-Qaeda's ideology or its U.S.-focused strategy. The efforts to create local franchises have also undermined one of al-Qaeda's primary achievements: the creation of a transnational entity based on religious, not national, affiliation. The book argues that al-Qaeda's branching out strategy was not a sign of strength, but instead a response to its decline in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Franchising reflected an escalation of al-Qaeda's commitments in response to earlier strategic mistakes, leaders' hubris, and its diminished capabilities. Although the introduction of new branches helped al-Qaeda create a frightening image far beyond its actual capabilities, ultimately this strategy neither increased the al-Qaeda threat, nor enhanced the organization's political objectives. In fact, the rise of ISIS from an al-Qaeda branch to the dominant actor in the jihadi camp demonstrates how expansion actually incurred heavy costs for al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda Franchise goes beyond explaining the adoption of a branching out strategy, also exploring particular expansion choices. Through nine case studies, it analyzes why al-Qaeda formed branches in some arenas but not others, and why its expansion in some locations, such as Yemen, took the form of in-house franchising (with branches run by al-Qaeda's own fighters), while other

locations, such as Iraq and Somalia, involved merging with groups already operating in the target arena. It ends with an assessment of al-Qaeda's future in light of the turmoil in the Middle East, the ascendance of ISIS, and US foreign policy. Few social and political phenomena have been debated as frequently or fervidly as neoliberalism and neo-jihadism. Yet, while discourse on these phenomena has been wide-ranging, they are rarely examined in relation to one another. Neoliberalism and Neo-jihadism examines political-economic characteristics of twentieth- and early twenty-first-century 'neo-jihadism'. Drawing on Bourdieusian and neo-Marxist ideas, it investigates how the neo-jihadist organisations, Al Qaeda and Islamic State, engage with the late modern capitalist paradigm of neoliberalism in their anti-capitalist propaganda and quasi-capitalist financial practices. An investigation of documents and discourses reveals interactions between neoliberalism and neo-jihadism characterised by surface-level contradiction, and structural connections that are both dialectical and mutually reinforcing. Neoliberalism here is argued to constitute an underlying 'status quo', while neo-jihadism, as an evolving form of political organisation, is perpetuated as part of this situation. Representing differentiated, unique, and exclusive examples of the (r)evolutionary phenomenon of neo-jihadism, Al Qaeda and Islamic State are demonstrated to be characteristic of the mutually constitutive nature of 'power and resistance'. Just as resistance movements throughout modern history come to resemble the forms of power they sought to overthrow, so too have Al Qaeda and Islamic State reconstituted the dominant political-economic paradigm of neoliberalism they mobilised in response to. The al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) are transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam. It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy them. The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of strategically-relevant differences between these two transnational terrorist entities. In it, one shall find a careful comparative analysis across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and specific implications and recommendations for current USG policy and strategy. Key questions that are addressed include: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni "jihadism"? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to USG strategists and professional military educators?

Jihadist narratives have evolved dramatically over the past five years, driven by momentous events in the Middle East and beyond; the death of bin Laden; the rise and ultimate failure of the Arab Spring; and most notably, the rise of the so-called Islamic State. For many years, al-Qaeda pointed to an aspirational future Caliphate as their utopian end goal - one which allowed them to justify their violent excesses in the here and now. Islamic State turned that aspiration into a dystopic reality, and in the process hijacked the jihadist narrative, breathing new life into the global Salafi-Jihadi movement. Despite air-strikes from above, and local disillusionment from below, the new caliphate has stubbornly persisted and has been at the heart of ISIS's growing global appeal. This timely collection of essays examines how jihadist narratives have changed globally, adapting to these turbulent circumstances. Area and thematic specialists consider transitions inside the Middle East and North Africa as well as in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. As these analyses demonstrate, the success of the ISIS narrative has been as much about resonance with local contexts, as it has been about the appeal of the global idea of a tangible and realised caliphate.

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